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In my professional experience, the Year-
book of Physical Anthropology has been an
extremely useful outlet for publications in
biological anthropology and a very handy
source of information, especially since the
association conceived of its use to publish
significant summaries of key topics. How-
ever, responding to a Yearbook article is
possible only in the journal, and it is for this
reason that I note here a troublesome mis-
representation of my work in the 1999 Year-
book.
In it, Lockwood and Fleagle (1999, p. 224)
made the following argument, reviewing a
series of debates that took place in Fleagle’s
own journal, Evolutionary Anthropology, as
part of their discussion about the uses and
misuses of homoplasy.
Wolpoff (1994) criticized Tattersall’s (1994) view that
Neandertals and humans are different species and have
distinct evolutionary trajectories because several simi-
larities between Neandertals and humans would be
forced to evolve in parallel. Tattersall (1996) retorted
with statements that “Neanderthal-like” characters
should be expected in some modern human populations,
like the early humans from Europe, because Neander-
tals and humans are closely related, and homoplasy
among their populations is likely to be common. There-
fore homoplasy is a weak argument against a recent
origin of humans, who then replaced Neandertals in
Europe. Wolpoff (1997) later reversed his position on
homoplasy, deciding that it could be used to support a
multiregional argument for human evolution. His view
was that homoplasy is so probable in closely related
organisms that cladistic definitions of modern humans
(tending to exclude Neandertals) cannot be trusted.
I have never “reversed” my position on
homoplasy, and it is hard to understand
where this assertion about my “reversed”
position came from. The higher occurrence
of homoplasies between closely related spe-
cies makes a cladistic approach difficult to
apply at this level of phylogenetic resolu-
tion, because it relies on the parsimonious
assumption that homology is the most prob-
able cause of identity. Nevertheless, multi-
ple homoplasies and parallel patterns of an-
atomical changes are still improbable, even
between closely related species, and the in-
terpretation that such similarities can be
explained as homoplasy is even more ques-
tionable when there is no compelling reason
to believe that the populations being com-
pared were reproductively isolated. This is
why I have supported multiregional evolu-
tion with the argument that the alternative
explanation, of geographic differentiation
and different regional continuities involving
different distinct human species, is improb-
able because it requires the interpretation
that there were numerous homoplasies and
parallel evolutionary trends (Wolpoff and
Caspari, 1996). To cite a few examples, why
should there be a high incidence of the H-O
mandibular foramen form and the combina-
tion of both large frontal and maxillary si-
nuses in European Neandertals and Aurig-
nacian/Pavlovians, but nowhere else in the
world? Why should the malar notch and up-
per central incisor shoveling involving a
strong marginal ridge and straight crown
face evolve twice in China? Why should a
strong lateral frontal trigone appear only in
the Ngandong Indonesians and Pleistocene
Native Australians? In australopithecine
species, the homoplasies are, for the most
part, in functional systems, whereas for the
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above-mentioned similarities and many oth-
ers, the features are nonadaptive. The point
is that recognizing that homoplasies are rel-
atively more common among closely related
species does not make homoplasy the most
persuasive explanation for so many similar-
ities, and there is no way to construe my
stance as being that multiregional evolution
is supported by the untrustworthiness of
cladistic definitions of modern humans that
exclude Neandertals.
It is true and Lockwood and Fleagle are
absolutely correct to say that I think cladis-
tic definitions of modern humans cannot be
trusted, but that is not a reversal of opinion.
In fact, it is hardly surprising and would be
the case whether or not modern humans are
a unique species. I am certainly not the first
to note that phylogenetics defines relation-
ships, not species. Modern humans are not
an evolutionary entity of any sort, and they
cannot be defined beyond the description
that modern humanity means all living peo-
ple and their immediate ancestors (Wolpoff
and Caspari, 1997). But even if they were an
evolutionary entity, it remains the case that
there can be no cladistic definition of mod-
ern humans, or of any other species or sub-
species. In any event, long before this de-
bate began, I showed that modern humans
cannot be defined without including Nean-
dertals, unless that definition does not in-
clude all modern humans, which would
make no sense (Wolpoff, 1986). This, how-
ever, is a statement about variation and not
about homoplasy, which is an explanation of
similarity.
Moreover, one place this alleged “rever-
sal” of my position certainly did not come
from is the article cited. This article was
mostly about the identification of homoplasy
and the problems raised by homoplasy in
australopithecine phylogenetics, where its
debilitating effects are well recognized and
continue to create havoc, as expressed in the
low consistency indexes for the various phy-
logenetic schemes. The few comments I
made about homoplasy in Pleistocene hu-
man evolution are detailed here.
In spite of all of the difficulties that homoplasies have
created in establishing the pattern of relationship be-
tween closely related hominid species, there are paleo-
anthropologists who insist on using the same cladistic
techniques to establish the pattern of relationships of
populations within one—ours! But using cladistics
within our species is plagued with even more problems
than the analysis of closely related species. Many more
sources of similarities than homoplasies also do not
reflect the pattern of descent, because human popula-
tions are not isolated and constantly branching, as are
species (Wolpoff, 1997, p.8).
I have left intact the italics and bold-face
type I placed in the manuscript as submit-
ted, although these were removed from the
publication during the editorial process.
Perhaps they would have helped avoid this
misinterpretation by emphasizing that this
part of the discussion was about variation
within a species, which I have long argued
cannot be described in terms of homology
and homoplasy, a position also reflected in
the Lockwood and Fleagle article.
I, for one, think the debates with Tatter-
sall have been quite useful, and I regret
other authors stumbling into what Tatter-
sall and I have successfully avoided, the
mischaracterization of the positions repre-
sented in the ongoing discussion between
us. This cannot possibly serve to clarify the
issues at stake, but will confuse them,
which is an unfortunate accomplishment for
an article reviewing the topic.
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